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And there are special satisfactions in looking upon both
entities as being infinite in time and space. For biology
teachers to think of life and energy as being sibling entities
becomes a challenge that holds great promise. And this is
not only because such a challenge is consistent with the
first chapter of the book of Genesis. It is most inspiring to
think of the animate world catching up with the rate of
progress in the inanimate world. Were both entities to
receive similar treatment, perhaps humanity can give up
behaviors that could very well have been left in the cave,
or if you prefer, in the Garden. To pass this challenge
along to America’s 40,000 biology teachers can be an effec-
tive way to recognize the role that their profession plays in
our society. It will be up to people who can cope with the
complexities of communication but I will gladly provide
the first one thousand dollars to finance a first class letter
that reminds our biology teachers of the central theme
of the “Controversy” booklet and includes appropriate
versions of the above ideas.
John H. Woodburn
ASA Member
105 Meadow Green Court
Amherst, VA 24521
woodburn@sbc.edu
Theistic Science:
The Metaphysics of Science
A recent letter of mine,1 which suggests that an entity in
nature is either: (1) purely physical, (2) purely nonphysi-
cal, or (3) both, viz., physical/nonphysical and considers
the existence of the supernatural, was meant to clarify
the theistic science put forward by Roy Clouser.2 In fact,
several authors criticized Clouser’s attempt of a theistic
science.3 Nonetheless, in a recent letter, Clouser character-
izes the “purely physical” as “on a par with talk about
square circles.”4
Clouser’s objection that an entity could be purely phys-
ical is based on the gedanken experiment of “thinking
away the non-physical properties of a thing to see what
they have had left when they finished.”5 Clouser adheres
to the philosophy of Herman Dooyeweerd,6 to whom
even atoms, clearly purely physical entities, can have
“biotic, sensory, logical, linguistic, and many other kinds
of properties.”7 Surely, atomic properties, e.g., mass, spin,
change, etc., are detected by purely physical devices via
physical interactions and such data is ascribed to inherent
properties of individual atoms.
Physics deals with the physical aspect of nature. A rea-
sonable start then is to suppose that science is the study
of the physical aspect of nature and its subject matter is
data that can be collected, in principle, by purely physical
devices. Note that only the physical aspects of physical/
nonphysical entities are amenable to the study of science.
Accordingly, life, rationality, consciousness, etc. are
purely nonphysical since purely physical devices cannot
detect them. Herein lies the non-reductive aspect of our
set-theoretic description of the whole of reality.
Laws of experimental science are generalizations of
historical propositions, viz. experimental data. Thus, his-
tory is constitutive of experimental science, whereas meta-
physics is regulative of it, while formal logic and
mathematics are instrumental to it. Theology is neither
constitutive, nor instrumental, nor regulative of science.
Hence, theistic science can only be envisioned as supply-
ing the metaphysics that regulates science without creat-
ing incompatibility between historical propositions and
particular theological propositions.
Consider a book, which is purely physical even if it
contains ciphered, rational information. A rational human
being, which is a physical/nonphysical entity, together
with the book, gives rise to more than just the sum of its
parts. By deciphering the information, the human acquires
knowledge, which is purely nonphysical.
Similarly, purely physical devices collect data when
interacting with other entities, whether purely physical or
physical/nonphysical, which the experimenter transforms
into purely nonphysical knowledge via data analysis and
theory building. Of course, one ought never to forget that
human rationality characterizes the whole of reality by
nonphysical mental models, abstractions, and constructs
that have their counterparts in the real but are not neces-
sarily identical to them.8
Scientists deal with secondary causes, not first causes.9
The latter involves ontological questions.10 From the
standpoint of the order of being, one can say that without
the ontological neither the generalizations nor the histori-
cal propositions of the experimental sciences would be
possible. However, the theistic concept of creation ex nihilo
is actually impossible for humans to understand or think
since prior to creation there is nothingness, which humans
cannot conceive. Only an intelligence, infinitely superior
to ours, a super intelligence, can be in the presence of noth-
ingness and make something happen.
It is commendable to attempt to develop a theistic
science. For the Christian, two verses would have to be
central: (1) “All things came into being through him, and
apart from him nothing came into being that has come
into being” John 1:3; and (2) “… true knowledge of God’s
mystery, that is, Christ himself, in whom are hidden
all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge” Col. 2:2–3.
However, I do not know how to use such revealed knowl-
edge to do science except to require a metaphysics that is
regulative of it that is consistent with such biblical verses.
Christ, who is the Creator and source of all knowledge,
is the ultimate goal of all those seeking truth in any
discipline. It is difficult to know God with the puny tools
of science. As we get closer and closer to the truth,
our science must merge with our theology otherwise we
will be following a false end of our scientific inquiry.
I think Max Planck said it best: “God is the beginning
of every religion and at the end of the natural sciences.”
All scientists who have any depth to their work will find
the hand of God in nature or else a mystery that they
refuse to identify with God.
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Clouser’s Response to Alexanian
If I understand Alexanian’s letter correctly, he agrees with
me that the way belief in God should impact theories is
neither the fundamentalist program of finding theory
content in Scripture nor the idea that biblical teaching is
largely walled off from theory-making. He says: “… I do
not know how to use … revealed knowledge to do science
except to require a metaphysics that is regulative of it
that is consistent with … biblical verses [about creation
ex nihilo].” That was precisely my proposal, so it is the
outworking of such a metaphysics he objects to rather
than the program itself.
The metaphysics I proposed as consonant with the
doctrine of creation is a systematically non-reductionist
one (in the senses of “reduction” I defined). I argued for
a theory of reality that eschews the traditional approach to
metaphysics, namely, positing something in creation as
exclusively X, where X is a basic kind of properties-and-
laws. Alexanian rejects my non-reductionist proposal but
neither offers an argument for his rejection of my view
nor a critique of the argument I gave for it. He merely
says that physics studies the physical aspect of things,
which is surely right. But from that it does not follow
that things have only that aspect. Just as we abstract the
physical properties of things for study, we may also
abstract their quantitative, spatial, biotic, sensory, logical,
etc., properties-and-laws. And I see no reason why the
studies conducted of those aspects of things are any the
less sciences than physics is.
The pluralistic ontology I advocate recognizes a dis-
tinction in the way a thing may possess its properties:
actively or passively. A rock, e.g., possesses quantitative,
spatial, and physical properties actively which means its
having them does not depend on its relations to other
things. But it does not actively possess biotic properties
as it is not alive. It can, however, have passive biological
properties in relation to things that are alive. For example,
a small rock can be swallowed by a bird and take part in
its digestive processes, or a larger rock may be the wall of
an animal’s den. Similarly, a rock does not perceive. It has
no sensory capacities and no active sensory properties.
But did it not have sensory properties passively, it could
not be perceived in relation to creatures who do have
active sensory functions. Just so, a rock does not think;
it possesses no logical properties actively. But, once again,
were the rock not subject to logical laws and in possession
of passive logical properties, we could form no concept
of it. In this sense, I contend, everything in creation has
some properties of every basic kind and is subject to the
laws of every kind. And as we cannot so much as frame
the idea of any kind apart from the rest, none are plausible
candidates for divine status.
The argument I gave for this view still stands: try to
form an idea of anything with only X kind of properties
and you will see that you cannot do it. Alexanian claims
that a book has only physical properties but does not meet
the challenge of that argument. What, pray tell, is the idea
of a book that is exclusively physical? A book that has no
quantity, has no shape and is not in space, has no sensory
appearance and is not logically distinguishable from any-
thing else, is no book.
Roy Clouser
ASA Member
204 Bradley Ave.
Haddonfield, NJ 08033
royclouser@comcast.net
Are the Products of ANT and SCNT
Equivalent? A Response to Peterson
Jim Peterson’s article, “The Ethics of the ANT Proposal to
Obtain Embryo-Type Stem Cells,” (PSCF 58, no. 4 [2006]:
294–302), is misinformed about the biological equivalence
between altered nuclear transfer (ANT) and cloning, and
it fails to provide moral guidance on the ethics of ANT.
Peterson equates ANT and somatic cell nuclear transfer
(SCNT, or cloning) on the biological level. According to
Peterson, ANT produces an entity that would “function
as an embryo except it would not be able to grow into
a normal fetus” (p. 294), while SCNT (following McHugh)
results in “an embryo-like entity that can form tissue but
not organize a fetus …” (p. 302). Although he equates ANT
and SCNT, Peterson prefers SCNT because “it may meet
the same moral concerns [as ANT] with fewer technical
challenges” (p. 302). Peterson’s judgment represents a prag-
matic preference based on false biological premises.
Equivalence between the products of ANT and SCNT
obscures the biological distinction between transcription
factors and coding genes. Transcription factors control the
pattern of gene expression, while coding genes contain
information necessary to the production of proteins
required for cellular function. Transcription factors are
ubiquitous, occurring both in the cytoplasm and the
nucleus, whereas coding genes are found only in the
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